This paper examines the evolution of national competition (antitrust) policies and enforcement approaches vis-à-vis intellectual property rights (IPRs) and associated anticompetitive practices in major jurisdictions over the past several decades. It focuses especially on the underlying process of economic learning that has, the authors suggest, driven relevant policy changes. Part 2 of the paper outlines the breakthroughs in understanding that have underpinned the evolution of competition policy approaches toward intellectual property licensing arrangements in the US, Canada and the EU. Part 3 elaborates the foundational insights that have motivated competition policy interventions with respect to 'newer' issues such as anti-competitive patent settlements and hold-ups in relation to standard setting processes, in addition to the modern focus on mergers that potentially lessen incentives for innovation and on abuse of dominance/single firm exclusionary practices in IP-intensive network industries. Part 4 outlines some of the core policy concerns and insights driving the increased emphasis that leading competition authorities now devote to policy advocacy and research in relation to the scope and definition of IP rights. Overall, the analysis suggests, firstly, that competition policy applications in the intellectual property sphere are matters of fundamental importance for economic advancement and prosperity, having a direct bearing on innovation, growth and the diffusion of new technologies. Indeed, the roles of IP and competition policy are now sufficiently intertwined and interdependent that neither can be well understood or applied in an optimal fashion in the absence of the other. Secondly, the thought evolution described herein implies that successful policy applications require careful study of market structure and behaviour, not in the abstract but with reference to the particular markets affected. Thirdly, it augurs favourably for the prospects of continuing gradual and incremental convergence in national approaches in this area, even spanning developed and developing countries, on the basis of continual learning and informed self-interest.
I. Introduction
The treatment of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and associated firm practices by leading competition agencies has undergone far-reaching changes in the working lifetimes of many current practitioners, including ourselves. In most jurisdictions, antiquated 'per se' approaches to IPR licensing practices previously viewed as irredeemably harmful to competition have long given way to 'rule of reason' or case-by-case approaches that require consideration of potential justifications and/or ameliorating circumstances or, at the very least, employ structural screens to avoid unnecessary policy interventions. 2 At the same time, important enforcement actions have been taken, in diverse jurisdictions, against a broad range of other practices implicating the role of intellectual property, including mergers deemed likely to undermine incentives for innovation; anticompetitive settlements in patent litigation cases relating to prospective entry by generic suppliers in the pharmaceutical sector; 'hold-ups' involving undeclared patents in standard-setting processes; and unilateral abuses of market power derived (at least in part) from IPRs, in hightechnology industries.
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In addition, following a period in which competition authorities largely deferred to intellectual property offices with respect to issues concerning the scope and legitimacy of patents and other IPRs, leading agencies such as the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice, the European Commission, the Canadian Competition Bureau and others have devoted significant resources to advocacy efforts aimed at ensuring the integrity of patent regimes and avoiding the issuance/recognition of ill-founded rights that potentially weaken competition or impede follow-on innovation without serving valid off-setting purposes. 4 The activities of patent assertion entities (i.e., 'trolls') and other practices have similarly come under scrutiny. 5 Such efforts represent an important complement to the agencies' enforcement actions particularly in circumstances where the intellectual property system is itself the source of unnecessary impediments to competition. In such circumstances, direct action to correct the underlying problem is likely to be a far more efficient solution than the repeated enforcement actions that might otherwise be necessary. 6 On the surface, there might appear to be a random character to these patterns of intervention and non-intervention by competition agencies in relation to IPRs, akin to perceptions . 3 See Part 3, below, and references cited therein. 4 See Part 4, below. 5 See Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study (October 2016). Available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf. 6 William E. Kovacic of 'swinging pendulums' in other domains of competition policy and law enforcement. 7 In this chapter, we take a different view. The evident evolution of competition policies and enforcement approaches vis-à-vis IPRs over the past several decades derives first and foremost, we suggest, from a far-reaching process of economic learning that has taken place during the same period. The learning process has encompassed, in addition to other aspects: (i) improved understanding of the role and effects of vertical licensing practices and single-firm exclusionary conduct, including new understanding of the harmful effects of a range of specific practices associated with the exercise of IP; (ii) a far more subtle understanding of the role of intellectual property itself in relation to market power and its exercise than competition agencies once held; and (iii) a better appreciation of problems associated with IP regimes themselves, and the role that both competition enforcement and advocacy work can play in addressing adverse implications for competition, innovation and the diffusion of new inventions and creative works.
The foregoing interpretation is not particularly original -indeed, as we shall point out, it builds directly on important scholarly work and on new thinking processes in the relevant agencies themselves, beginning now several decades ago. We, nonetheless, believe it is useful to set out in an integrated fashion some of the most important insights underlying the evolution and adaptation of enforcement policies in this area. This is the purpose of this chapter. This is important, in part, to help younger enforcement agencies and competition law jurisdictions to learn from the experiences of older ones and to avoid, where possible, the unnecessary replication of their policy errors. Perhaps, it will also contribute to what we see as an ongoing gradual process of learningbased international convergence in this subject-area.
The issues discussed in this paper are also of direct relevance to the role and application of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in that recognition of the scope for and role of competition policy in relation to IP is an important part of the flexibilities and balance built into that Agreement. At the same time, the relevant provisions of the Agreement (especially Article 40 and 31) provide relatively little in the way of practical guidance for jurisdictions wishing to implement relevant measures. For this, we must look, at least in part, to WTO Members' experience at the national level and to related scholarly analysis and reflection. The evolution of thinking set out in this chapter carries major implications for the core concerns and premises of the broader volume of which it will form a part. It suggests, firstly, that competition policy applications in the intellectual property sphere are matters of fundamental importance for economic advancement and prosperity, having a direct bearing on innovation and the diffusion of new technologies. Indeed, as we will suggest, the role of IP and related 7 See, regarding the dubious merits of the pendulum hypothesis in regard to single-firm exclusionary practices, William E. Kovacic applications of competition policy are now sufficiently intertwined and interdependent that neither can be well understood or applied in an optimal fashion in the absence of the other. 9 Secondly, the thought evolution that we describe implies that successful policy applications require careful study of market structure and behaviour, not in the abstract but with reference to the particular markets affected. And thirdly, it augurs favourably for the prospects of continuing gradual and incremental convergence in national approaches in this area, spanning developed and developing countries, on the basis of continual learning and informed self-interest as opposed to top-down coordination.
Two important limitations on the scope of the analysis must be noted. First, while the insights and concepts to which we will point have, we believe, broad application, our historical reflections and thinking are informed principally by the experience of the jurisdictions that we know best, namely the United States, the European Union and Canada. This approach is nonetheless valid and illuminating, we submit, in that many of the essential learning processes and policy innovations influencing developments elsewhere initially took place principally in those jurisdictions. This is not to suggest that this will always be the case. 10 Second, the focus, throughout, is on the insights and conceptual breakthroughs that have (in our view) animated policy changes, as opposed to a detailed accounting of policy changes across jurisdictions. Where appropriate, we attempt to remedy this deficiency through references to other chapters of this book and/or other research that (we believe) bears out our underlying premises.
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Part 2 outlines the breakthroughs in understanding that have underpinned the evolution of competition policy approaches toward intellectual property licensing arrangements in the US, Canada and the EU. These have, we suggest, been important not only for the evolution of policy stances toward licensing arrangements in other jurisdictions but also for the treatment of intellectual property rights in those jurisdictions more generally. Part 3 elaborates the foundational insights that have animated competition policy interventions with respect to 'newer' issues such as anti-competitive patent settlements and holdups in relation to standard setting processes in addition to the modern focus on mergers that potentially lessen incentives for innovation and on abuse of dominance/single firm exclusionary practices in IP-intensive network industries. The key here, we suggest, has been a focus on specific behaviours and contexts associated with intellectual property rights that are likely to have anti-competitive consequences (as opposed to the more generalized scepticism of the role of IPRs that sometimes motivated competition law interventions in the past). Part 4 outlines some of the core policy concerns and insights driving the increased emphasis that leading competition authorities now devote to policy advocacy and research in relation to the scope and definition of IP rights. Part 5 provides concluding remarks.
II.
The early evolution of policy relating to the treatment of licensing arrangements: underlying insights informing diverse aspects of the competition policy-intellectual property interface
The principal early area of evolution in the competition policy treatment of IP in the US, Canada and the EU concerned the treatment of patent and other technology licensing arrangements. The US, followed by Canada, led the process. In broad terms, these jurisdictions transitioned from enforcement approaches that condemned many vertical licensing practices out of hand ('per se rules') to a considerably more nuanced approach entailing case-by-case analysis of competing pro-and anti-competitive explanations of the practices in question. 12 Account was also taken of structural conditions (especially, the existence of competing technologies) that, in many cases, limit the possibility of anti-competitive effects.
More specifically, the far-reaching evolution of the treatment of licensing arrangements in key developed jurisdictions -from one of ostensibly strict or 'per se' prohibition to a broadly permissive case-by-case approach -reflected, in our view, three fundamental innovations in competition policy and economic thought. First, the treatment of restrictive intellectual property licensing arrangements that are inherently vertical in nature (i.e., they are imposed on/by firms at succeeding levels of particular technology-based production chains) was greatly influenced by the revision of thinking and enforcement approaches concerning vertical market restraints generally. Second, related to the above and in contrast to previously prevailing thinking, the realization dawned that IPRs do not, in most cases, constitute 'monopolies' in an economically meaningful sense. The reason for this is simple, yet powerful: in many or (possibly) most cases, competing technologies or other IP exist that effectively preclude the exercise of market power by individual rights-holders. 18 As affirmed in both the 1995 and the 2017 US DOJ-FTC Guidelines (in identical The agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. Although the intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific product, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power. A third logical insight underlying the evolution of policy in this area is that, even where IP rights do, in particular cases, generate market power, they may nonetheless serve the over-riding purpose of promoting competition in a dynamic sense. As stated in the 1995 DOJ-FTC Guidelines:
The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and original works of expression. In the absence of intellectual property rights, imitators could more rapidly exploit the efforts of innovators and investors without compensation. Rapid imitation would reduce the commercial value of innovation and erode incentives to invest, ultimately to the detriment of consumers.
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In this language, the agencies were acknowledging both the importance for economic progress of the 'Schumpeterian' dimension of competition in which, through a process of 'creative destruction', inferior products and processes are continually replaced by superior ones, 22 and the legitimate role of intellectual property in propelling this process. The Schumpeterian perspective and, more generally, greater emphasis on the dynamic aspects of competition also underlay, to an important degree, the 1990s literature on 'innovation markets' that motivated and guided competition law interventions to block mergers that threatened to weaken incentives for innovation. 23 At the same time, and importantly, competition policy analysis and enforcement measures largely avoided being trapped in an excessively narrow and deferential application of Schumpeterian thinking that would unnecessarily privilege market power or inhibit appropriate enforcement activities by competition authorities where they are, in fact, warranted. As a fourth logical element, building on all of the above, the competition agencies of the US and Canada famously embraced the view that, for purposes of competition law enforcement, intellectual property rights can most reasonably be treated as analogous to other forms of property, including real property. As affirmed in the 1995 US DOJ-FTC Guidelines:
The Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible property. That is not to say that intellectual property is in all respects the same as any other form of property. Intellectual property has important characteristics, such as ease of misappropriation, that distinguish it from many other forms of property. These characteristics can be taken into account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require the application of fundamentally different principles. 25 Taking account of all of the above, the competition agencies of the US and Canada affirmed the 'common purposes' of the two fields. As stated by the 1995 DOJ-FTC US Guidelines:
The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and original works of expression.
[…] The antitrust laws promote innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.
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The foregoing view also is now reflected in US appellate jurisprudence. 27 One element of the conceptual underpinnings of the 1995 DOJ-FTC Guidelines that was subsequently revisited and reassessed, to an extent, by the relevant agencies was the idea of 'innovation markets'. 28 As put forward in the 1995 DOJ-FTC Guidelines:
An innovation market consists of the research and development directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development. The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, and goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the relevant research and development, for example, by limiting the ability and incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of research and development.
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The utility of the idea of innovation markets was met with skepticism on the part of analysts who questioned both its susceptibility to concrete application and whether it added value in comparison to existing analytical tools, notably the concept of potential competition. 30 Subsequently, in the 2017 revision to the Guidelines, references to innovation markets were dropped in favor of references to the more concrete concept of research and development markets. innovation markets and the literature that it spawned served to galvanize both a very appropriate focus by enforcement agencies on mergers and other practices that weaken or vitiate incentives for R&D/related activities and a lasting interest in the significance of competition law enforcement for innovation and economic progress on the part of practitioners and academics alike. 31 Another element of the thought evolution process described above which has been challenged in some quarters concerns the analogizing of intellectual property to other forms of property, including real property. A key insight here is that patent rights are inherently more probabilistic in nature than real property rights. As observed by Lemley and Shapiro:
Virtually all property rights contain some element of uncertainty. The owner of real estate may find that the title to that property is flawed; title insurance exists to deal with this risk. The (careless) owner of a trademark may find that its mark has been used so widely as to become a generic term, thus losing trademark protection. But the uncertainty associated with patents is especially striking, and indeed is fundamental to understanding the effects of patents on innovation and competition. There are two fundamental dimensions of uncertainty: 1) uncertainty about the commercial significance of the invention being patented, and 2) uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right being granted.
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As the authors go on to observe, uncertainty regarding the commercial significance of patents is critical when studying the processes by which they are issued. Uncertainty about validity and scope are important in evaluating issues concerning patent litigation and enforcement. As well, both forms of uncertainty impact on (and can materially diminish) the incentives that patents are intended to create. 33 An important related insight shared by many current thinkers is that intellectual property rights -perhaps especially patents -arguably exhibit greater incentives for and susceptibility to opportunistic or anticompetitive behavior as compared to most forms of real property. Indeed, differences with other forms of property rights are also acknowledged, to an extent, in the 2017 US DOJ-FTC Guidelines. 34 More pointedly, two prominent scholars in the field, Fiona Scott Morton that, in assessing the role of IPRs as a potential source of market power, it is indeed important to bear in mind the characteristics that distinguish them from real property. The evolution in thinking described above, in any case, eventually animated far-reaching parallel changes in enforcement policies in other jurisdictions, notably the European Union and Japan. In the EU, an early 'Block exemption regulation' for licensing arrangements which was based, to a considerable extent, on legal formalism, intrinsic suspicion of intellectual property rights and the over-riding objective of creating a unified European market gave way, eventually, to the present (2014) regulation, 37 embodying a modern, economics-based approach that resembles the US and Canadian approaches in its effects if not in its legal form. 38 Likewise, a far-reaching transformation has taken place in Japan's treatment of intellectual property licensing arrangements under its competition law, from one of legal formalism and an avowed stress on industrial policy objectives to a more economics-based approach recognizing both the potentially benign effects of 'restrictive' licensing arrangements and the importance of competing technologies as a check on market power.
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The foregoing insights and breakthroughs were, we suggest, the core ideas motivating the 'early' evolution of enforcement policies in the area of the competition policy-intellectual property interface (i.e., the adjustments that took place in the US and Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the EU, Japan and other jurisdictions in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century). Policy implementation in this area has, however, certainly not stood still since then. The conceptual breakthroughs and developments underlying policy change in this period (broadly, since the issuance of the 1995 DOJ-FTC Guidelines) are the subject of the next section of this chapter.
III. Insights and improvements in understanding underlying more recent changes in competition enforcement policies
Policy adaptation regarding the competition policy-intellectual property interface has continued apace since the second half of the 1990s. Two principal trends can be identified: first, concerning the enforcement of competition laws, attention and enforcement activity have shifted from licensing arrangements to a range of other specific behaviours and contexts deemed to entail significant risks of anti-competitive consequences (e.g., mergers that threaten to undermine the incentives for innovation in particular markets; anti-competitive patent settlement agreements; patent thickets and arrangements to facilitate their successful navigation; 'hold-ups' in the context of arrangements governing access to standard-essential patents and single-firm exclusionary abuses of dominant position in network industries). Perhaps to a surprising degree, these trends were driven by learning processes in academia and/or in the enforcement agencies themselves.
These developments are the focus of this section of the chapter.
To highlight up front the theme of this section, vital to the results achieved has indeed been a focus by the relevant enforcement agencies on particular behaviours and market contexts that threaten to diminish incentives for innovation, as opposed to the more generalized efforts to limit the role of intellectual property rights in the market economy that, in some cases, characterized earlier competition policy interventions and stances. In this way, enforcement authorities also avoided succumbing to excessive deference to the 'Schumpeterian' idea that a degree of market power or even an outright monopoly may be conducive to innovation. The key insight here is that well-constituted competition policies do not blindly oppose an appropriate degree of market concentration or even the emergence of dominant positions where this serves valid efficiencyrelated purposes or reflects superior business acumen. 40 Rather, competition policy interventions can be targeted precisely at market configurations and firm practices that are most likely to retard innovation, while leaving intact those that are unlikely to do so. As observed aptly by Jonathan
Baker:
[…] antitrust is not a general-purpose competition intensifier. Rather, antitrust intervention can be focused on industry settings and categories of behavior where enforcement can promote innovation. The modern economic understanding about the relationship between competition and innovation goes beyond Schumpeter and Arrow by suggesting ways for antitrust rules and enforcement efforts to target types of industries and types of conduct. Through such selection, antitrust intervention can systematically promote innovation competition and pre-innovation product market competition, which will encourage innovation, without markedly increasing post-innovation product market competition, and, thus, without detracting from the pro-innovation benefits.
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As discussed below, competition law enforcement efforts vis-à-vis intellectual property rights reflect, to an important degree, just such an effort to target practices that impede or undermine incentives for innovation while acknowledging the role of practices and market configurations that are necessary for the efficient organization and operation of markets.
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(1) An enhanced focus on mergers that potentially weaken the incentives for innovation and thereby impede economic progress As already discussed, at the same time as the 1995 DOJ-FTC Guidelines were being developed, the maintenance of incentives for innovation also became a more central guiding principle for horizontal merger policy in the US and other jurisdictions. This was an important, lasting impact, inter alia, of the 1990s literature on innovation markets. The preservation of incentives for innovation was a core consideration, for example, in the assessment of pharmaceutical industry mergers that have been reviewed by the US competition agencies in 40 In the US, this notion dates back at least to the 1945 opinion of Judge Learned Hand in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 41 Baker, above note 24. 42 An important example would be the role of patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements in overcoming the entry-deterring effects of patent thickets. recent times. 43 And, of course, this focus had a direct bearing on intellectual property, to the extent that the pace of innovation would be manifested by patenting activity.
The new focus had a measurable impact on US merger enforcement policy. As observed by one of the pioneers of this approach, Richard Gilbert, in 2006:
Merger enforcement statistics illustrate the increased importance of innovation concerns in antitrust policy. Until the mid-1990s, the DOJ and the FTC rarely mentioned innovation as a reason to challenge a merger. As shown in Table 1 , from 1990 until 1994, the DOJ and the FTC alleged adverse impacts on innovation in only about 3% of all merger challenges. From 1995 to 1999, the agencies cited adverse innovation effects in 18% of merger challenges. The agencies' concerns about innovation effects continued to increase in the first part of the new century. From 2000 to 2003 the DOJ and FTC mentioned innovation effects as a reason to challenge the merger in 38% of merger challenges. 44 As a further, tangible connection to the world of intellectual property, in many of the relevant cases, the divestiture or mandatory licensing of IPRs constituted an important element of the remedies applied. This is not a particularly new development: in fact, compulsory licensing has been an important element of antitrust remedies in mergers and monopolization cases for decades. 45 Still, the enhanced focus on innovation generally has highlighted the importance of such remedies. A key related insight is that a simple transfer of patent rights may be insufficient to enable a competitor to become commercially viable, if related know-how is not also made available.
(2) New focuses of enforcement activity driven by improved understanding of/experience related to specific IPR-related practices
Beyond the increased focus on innovation-threatening mergers, the period since the issuance of the 1995 DOJ-FTC Guidelines witnessed an important further rebalancing toward specific firm practices associated with the use of IPRs that, for the most part, had not been a significant focus of enforcement activity in the past. As developed below, four such practices or sets of practices were: (i) anti-competitive patent settlement agreements; (ii) patent thickets and arrangements to facilitate their successful navigation; (iii) 'hold-ups' in the context of arrangements governing access to standard-essential patents; and (iv) single-firm exclusionary practices and other abuses of a dominant position in network industries.
(a) Anti-competitive settlements of patent infringement suits
Since the year 2000, an important new focus of competition law enforcement activity in relation to intellectual property has concerned anti-competitive settlements in patent infringement cases that thwart entry by generic competitors. A key early research contribution underlying policy innovation in this area was Shapiro's pioneering work on patent settlements. That work highlighted that:
[…] the legal rules governing the resolution of [intellectual property] disputes are of firstorder importance. This importance is not confined to high-tech industries, much less to the software and Internet sectors, but extends to all industries where intellectual property rights are significant. In a very real sense, the rules governing settlements affect what is truly meant by the patent grant itself. In fact, in many fast-moving industries, the rules governing patent litigation and settlements are arguably far more important to patentees than the single variable on which economists have traditionally focused, namely patent length.
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A specific and highly influential context in which concern arose (first in the US) with respect to patent settlements involved the use of settlement agreements to deter entry by generic competitors in pharmaceutical markets. To an extent, the concern derived from incentives for generic entry -notably a 180 day statutory exclusivity period for the first generic entrant to enter a particular market -that were built into relevant US legislation, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act. As
Majoras explains, under the US legislation:
By increasing the potential economic value of generic entry, the statute also increased the incentive for brand and generic manufacturers to conspire to share rather than compete for the expected profits generated by sales of both brand and generic drugs. For example, a brand manufacturer and generic pharmaceutical company now have an incentive to divide up the profits from the Hatch-Waxman 180-day generic exclusivity period --a period that did not exist prior to the passage of the Act. In nearly any case in which generic entry is contemplated, the profit that the generic anticipates will be much less than the profit the brand-drug company would make from the same sales. Consequently, it will often be more profitable for the branded manufacturer to buy off generics.
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Of course, 'buying off' potential generic competitors is likely to be strongly contrary to the interests of consumers -hence, the concern for competition agencies.
Carrying forward the concern expressed in Majoras' statement, the role of patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industry was the subject of a series of enforcement actions by While the specifics of the US Hatch-Waxman Act provided the context for early enforcement action in this area, the underlying concern has subsequently been adopted and carried forward by other leading competition agencies. For example, pharmaceutical patent settlement agreements are an important focus of both monitoring and enforcement activity in the European Union. In a first pay-for-delay case, the Commission imposed significant fines on a Danish pharmaceutical company, Lundbeck, and on several producers of generic medicines who agreed to delay the market entry of cheaper generic versions of Lundbeck's branded citalopram, a high-sales antidepressant. 51 Similarly, pharmaceutical patent settlement agreements are noted as a specific area of concern in Canada's IPEGs. As well, competition law safeguards against anti-competitive settlement agreements appear relevant to measures being taken to facilitate effective responses to public health emergencies at the global level. […] thoughtful observers are increasingly expressing concerns that our patent (and copyright) system is in fact creating a patent thicket, a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. With cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation.
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Patent pools and/or cross-licensing can be an efficient response to these phenomena in many cases. This is notwithstanding that they also raise potential competition law concerns. 54 points toward the importance of correcting problems, where possible, at the level of the patent issuance process itself. 57 The impact of patent thickets is heightened by the risk of 'hold-ups' -that is, the danger that new products will inadvertently infringe on patents issued after the products were designed. 58 As explained by Kovacic:
Hold-up typically arises when a patentee asserts its patent after the accused infringer has sunk substantial costs into design, development, and commercialization without knowledge of the patent. The threat of an automatic injunction following expensive patent litigation increases the patentee's leverage in the licensing negotiations beyond the value of the patent's inventive contribution and leads to higher royalties. This dynamic can be especially problematic when the patented invention is only a small component of the infringing product. 59 A context in which hold-ups are likely to raise particular concerns is that of standard-setting organizations (SSOs). Such organizations provide a forum for the development of new standards through the sharing of information on pertinent inventions as they are developed. Their role is particularly important in industries where the need for standardization is recurring, for example, because there are many players and technology evolves rapidly. 60 However, once a standard is adopted and related investments have been made, firms implementing the standard may find switching technologies to be costly, creating a situation potentially facilitating the exercise of market power. As Renata Hesse, then US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, explains:
Because implementing the standard necessitates reading on the standard's incorporated patents, those patents become standards essential patents or SEPs for short. Standards essential patent holders may seek to take advantage of the market power that standardization of their patented technology creates by engaging in hold-up. They may, for instance, exclude a competitor from a market or obtain an unjustifiably higher royalty than would have been possible ex ante; that is, before the standard was set. This type of hold-up raises particular competition concerns when alternative technologies that could have been included in the standard were instead excluded from it. 61 Not all observers agree on the extent of the threat posed by hold-ups in relation to standard setting organizations. Indeed, some argue that 'hold-out' -infringement of the SEPs themselvesis a greater problem. 62 While further experience and evaluation may indeed be needed with respect to the relative magnitude of these concerns, the importance of these issues as a focus for reflection and analysis is not in doubt.
(c) Single-firm exclusionary conduct in network industries more generally
The concerns articulated relate particularly to the role of intellectual property in network industries. Such industries include telecommunications, computer hardware and software, and many other industries that are building blocks of the new, information-based economy. These industries often require common access to unique facilities, and are prone to the possibility of 'tipping' or 'locking into' inefficient standards. 63 As a result, the risk of undue exercise of market power through anti-competitive licensing and other practices is particularly high in these industries.
In the light of these concerns, some authors have suggested that assets protected by intellectual property which are critical to accessing a network should be capable of being treated as 'essential facilities' under competition law 64 and, therefore, subject to mandatory rights of access in circumstances where a refusal to license meets the general requirements of the essential facilities doctrine. 65 This position is controversial, however, in that, in the US and some other jurisdictions, the right to refuse to licence is generally viewed as being intrinsic to the grant at least of a patent, if not to other types of intellectual property. A specific related concern is that excessive scope for invocation of the essential facilities doctrine as a tool for accessing specific technologies could erode commercial incentives for development of alternative technologies. 66 The bundling of technology-embodying products, or of technologies themselves -in which the sale of one product (or the licensing of a particular technology) is conditioned on the purchase of another -has been a recurring concern in multiple jurisdictions. In its famous Microsoft case initiated in 1998, the US Department of Justice alleged that Microsoft, by bundling access to the Windows operating system with Internet Explorer, was excluding Netscape and other potential entrants from the browser market and was extending its monopoly in personal computer operating systems into internet browsing software. The case was concluded in 2001 with a settlement between the Department and Microsoft which, inter alia, imposed on Microsoft a requirement to provide software developers with the interfaces needed to inter-operate with the Windows system -thereby enabling them (potentially) to compete effectively with Microsoft. Pursuing a U.S. case against Google would be more complicated than in Europe, antitrust experts said, because of a higher standard of evidence needed to prove wrongdoing by the search giant. Rather than go to court, the FTC closed a similar investigation against Google in 2013 in exchange for Google's changing some of its business practices. 71 To summarize, in the foregoing and other recent decisions in the area of abuse of a dominant position in network industries (often also implicating IPRs), the European Union has clearly gone beyond the enforcement approaches and degree of activism that is manifested in this area in the US. The reasons for this would appear to lie in both differing judicial precedents and competition policy philosophies. According to Kovacic:
The European Union has not encountered the limitations faced by the U.S. antitrust agencies in using its law enforcement powers to address claims of exclusion involving intellectual property. EU doctrine governing abuse of dominance sets more stringent limits upon companies than prevailing judicial interpretations of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. In Microsoft and Intel, the European Commission obtained remedies notably more substantial than DOJ or the FTC attained in their cases, respectively. In Google, the European Commission seems poised to gain concessions related to search practices that emerged from the FTC's inquiry unscathed.
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IV.
The increasing focus on competition advocacy in diverse jurisdictions, and the underlying insights and policy concerns
Recent experience also underlines the importance of advocacy activities by competition agencies aimed at ensuring that patents and other forms of intellectual property rights are not awarded unnecessarily or cast in overly broad terms. 73 As explained by Kovacic:
One of the most important contributions of a competition policy system is to serve as an advocate within the government, and the country at large, for reliance on pro-competition policies. This is true, for instance, when the root of an observed competition policy problem resides in other government regulatory programs that distort the competitive process. In that case, the competition agency's aim should be to identify first-best solutions, which may involve reforms to the other regulatory regimes.
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The importance of targeted competition advocacy activities is, perhaps, particularly salient in the area of intellectual property. Such activities can include public education activities, studies and research undertaken to document the need for market-opening measures, formal appearances before legislative committees or other government bodies in public proceedings, or behind-the-scenes lobbying within government. 74 Kovacic, above note 6. monopolization concepts to expand access to IP rights-may be a crude, second-best solution to cure weaknesses that reside in the rights granting process'. 75 To be sure, the importance of competition agency advocacy and research activities bearing on intellectual property issues is not new. In Canada, the Competition Bureau and its predecessor agencies have long sought to exercise influence on the substance and content of IP policy, precisely as a means of addressing competition problems 'at their root'. Prominent examples include substantive, research-based interventions before public inquiries into matters including the operations of copyright collectives and the terms of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry. 76 In addition, the Bureau has sponsored two significant scholarly volumes addressing the competition policy-intellectual property interface more generally. 77 An obvious concern animating competition advocacy and related research concerning IPRs is the expansion of patentable subject matter that has occurred in many jurisdictions, over time. In the US, beginning in 1980, a series of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals added genetically engineered bacteria, software and business methods to the set of inventions that are considered to be patentable. 78 As a consequence, Lemley and Shapiro argue that inventors can potentially be expected to file patent applications even in areas that are not currently eligible for protection, simply as a way of 'hedging their bets'. This report provides a penetrating discussion of the harmful effects on competition that can flow from the awarding of unjustified patents (or patents that are cast in overly broad terms), and puts forward a range of proposals to address these problems.
The FTC Report references, and was heavily influenced by, the post-1995 academic literature e.g. on patent thickets; on tools for navigating such thickets (i.e., patent pools and licensing); on standards and hold-ups; on anti-competitive settlements in the pharmaceutical sector; and on other matters. With respect to all these matters, it documented and elucidated the interdependency of intellectual property and competition law and policy. Summarizing a key theme of the Report, Kovacic observes as follows:
To optimally foster innovation, patent and competition policy must work together. Errors or systematic biases in how one policy's rules are interpreted and applied disrupt the other policy's effectiveness. It is important to note that the FTC Report confirms that patents play an important role in promoting innovation. Nonetheless, it also raises concerns about the ability of those patents of questionable quality-those that are invalid or overly broad-to distort competition and harm innovation in several ways.
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To address these concerns, the Report put forward specific recommendations relating to diverse aspects of the US competition policy system. These included:
• Recommendations to minimize the issuance of questionable patents, notably through strengthening of the statutory requirement of non-obviousness;
• Recommendations to facilitate the elimination of questionable patents once they have been 
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More recently, in 2016, the FTC completed a further significant report implicating the interface of intellectual property and competition policy, this time on the subject of patent assertion entities (PAEs), colloquially known as 'patent trolls'. As defined in the Report, these are businesses that acquire patents from third parties and seek to generate revenue by asserting them against alleged infringers. PAEs monetize their patents primarily through licensing negotiations with alleged infringers, infringement litigation, or both. In other words, PAEs do not rely on producing, manufacturing, or selling goods. When negotiating, a PAE's objective is to enter into a royalty-bearing or lump-sum license. When litigating, to generate any revenue, a PAE must either settle with the defendant or ultimately prevail in litigation and obtain relief from the court.
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In terms of its substantive findings, the Report emphasizes that infringement litigation plays a legitimate role in protecting patent rights. It finds, nonetheless, that 'Nuisance infringement litigation, however, can tax judicial resources and divert attention away from productive business behavior.' To strike the right balance, the Report proposes reforms to: 1) address discovery burden and cost asymmetries in PAE litigation; 2) provide courts and defendants with more information about the entities that file infringement suits; 3) streamline overlapping cases brought against defendants on the same theories of infringement; and 4) provide adequate notice to defendants of such infringement theories. An important focus on competition advocacy activities relating to intellectual property has also been evident at the US Department of Justice. As outlined by Hesse:
[…] the intersection between intellectual property rights and antitrust law has been an important priority for the Division's competition advocacy program. [Three specific intellectual property-related topics on which the Division has focused are]: standardsessential patents, patent assertion entities, and prospective antitrust guidance regarding intellectual property through guidelines and business reviews. Our competition advocacy on IP topics has resulted in vigorous dialogue, improved rules and regulations, and more competitive outcomes in key IP-driven industries. The impact of the foregoing advocacy activities has, we suggest, not at all been limited to the jurisdictions in which they have been carried out. Rather, these efforts have resonated and influenced the evolution of policies around the world. To cite possibly the most obvious example, concern over the impact of anti-competitive patent settlements in the pharmaceutical industryinitially developed in the academic work of Carl Shapiro and then in the 2003 FTC Study -has become a focus of competition law enforcement, advocacy activity and or competition policy enforcement guidelines in jurisdictions around the world. 88 Likewise, concern over hold-ups in relation to standard-essential patents has been taken up in diverse jurisdictions. This is, we suggest, a clear testament to the power of ideas in the increasingly inter-connected competition policy world of the twenty-first century.
V. Concluding remarks
This chapter has attempted to sketch the main contours of the evolution in competition policy thinking that has, we believe, driven policy changes and applications in this area in the past several decades, across multiple jurisdictions. We began with the breakthroughs in understanding that underpinned the early evolution of competition policy approaches toward intellectual property licensing arrangements in the US, Canada and the EU. These have, we suggest, been important not only for the evolution of policy stances toward licensing arrangements in other jurisdictions but also for the treatment of intellectual property rights in those jurisdictions more generally.
Subsequently, the chapter has examined the foundational insights that have animated competition policy interventions with respect to 'newer' issues such as anti-competitive patent settlements and hold-ups in relation to standard setting processes in addition to the modern focus on mergers that potentially lessen incentives for innovation and on abuse of dominance/single firm exclusionary practices in IP-intensive network industries. The key here, we have suggested, has been a focus on specific behaviours and contexts associated with intellectual property rights that are likely to have anti-competitive consequences (as opposed to the more generalized scepticism of the role of IP rights that sometimes motivated competition law interventions in the past).
Consideration has also been given to the core policy concerns and insights driving the increased emphasis that leading competition authorities now devote to policy advocacy and research in relation to the scope and definition of IP rights.
As we have pointed out, the focus on specific behaviours and advocacy work has enabled competition agencies to give due attention and weight to the 'Schumpeterian' dimension of competition in which, through a process of 'creative destruction', inferior products and processes are continually replaced by superior ones, and the legitimate role of intellectual property in propelling this process. At the same time, and importantly, competition policy analysis and enforcement measures have largely avoided being trapped in an excessively narrow and deferential application of Schumpeterian thinking that would unnecessarily privilege market power or inhibit proactive enforcement actions by competition agencies where they are, in fact,
warranted.
The evolution of thinking set out in this chapter carries, in any case, major implications for the core concerns and premises of the broader volume of which it will form a part. It suggests, firstly, that competition policy applications in the intellectual property sphere are matters of fundamental importance for economic advancement and prosperity, having a direct bearing on innovation and the diffusion of new technologies. Indeed, the role of IP and related applications of competition policy are now sufficiently intertwined and interdependent that neither can be well understood or applied in an optimal fashion in the absence of the other. Secondly, the thought evolution that we describe implies that successful policy applications require careful study of market structure and behaviour, not in the abstract but with reference to the particular markets affected. And thirdly, it augurs favourably for the prospects of continuing gradual and incremental
